MTAT.07.003 CRYPTOLOGY II

Theoretical Background

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Probability Theory

What is ^a random variable?

A *discrete random variable* f is formally a function $f : \Omega \to \{0,1\}^*$ where Ω is a sample space that models non-deterministic behaviour. Now for each output y there is a corresponding *elementary event*

$$
\Omega_y = \{ \omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) = y \} .
$$

A probability measure Pr : F(Ω)→ [0, 1] describes relative likelihood of observable events $\mathcal{F}(\Omega) = \{\emptyset, \Omega_0\}$ $\{0, \Omega_1, \Omega_{00}, \Omega_{01}, \ldots, \Omega_0 \cup \Omega_1, \ldots, \Omega\}$:

$$
\Pr\left[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) \in \mathcal{Y}\right] \doteq \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \Pr\left[\omega \in \Omega_y\right] ,
$$

where by convention the probability measure is normalised

$$
\Pr[\omega \in \Omega] = \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr[\omega \in \Omega_y] = 1.
$$

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Conditional probability

Often, the presence of one event is correlated with some other events. Thecorresponding influence is formally quantified by *conditional probability*

$$
\Pr\left[f(\omega) = y | g(\omega) = x\right] \doteq \frac{\Pr\left[f(\omega) = y \land g(\omega) = x\right]}{\Pr\left[g(\omega) = x\right]}
$$

Consequently, for any two events A and B :

$$
Pr[A \wedge B] = Pr[A] \cdot Pr[B|A] = Pr[B] \cdot Pr[A|B] .
$$

Two events are independent if $Pr\left[A \wedge B\right] = Pr\left[A\right] \cdot Pr\left[B\right]$.

Total Probability Formula

Let $\mathcal{H}_1,\ldots,\mathcal{H}_n$ $_n$ be mutually exclusive events such that

 $\Pr\left[\mathcal{H}_{i} \wedge \mathcal{H}_{j}\right]=0$ and $\Pr\left[\mathcal{H}_{1} \vee \ldots \vee \mathcal{H}_{n}\right]=1$.

Then for any any event A we can express

$$
\Pr\left[A\right] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Pr\left[\mathcal{H}_{i}\right] \cdot \Pr\left[A|\mathcal{H}_{i}\right]
$$

.

PDF and CDF. Theory

Discrete random variables do not have a classical *probability density function*. Instead, we can consider probabilities of the smallest observable events $\Omega_0, \Omega_1, \Omega_{00}, \Omega_{01}, \ldots$ Consider the corresponding pseudo-density function

 $p_x \doteq \Pr \left[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) = x \right]$.

Then we can express a *cumulative distribution function*

$$
F(y) = \Pr\left[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) \le y\right]
$$

in terms of pseudo-density function

$$
F(y) = \sum_{x = -\infty}^{y} \Pr[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) = x] = \sum_{x = -\infty}^{y} p_x.
$$

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PDF and CDF. Illustration

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Expected value

The $\boldsymbol e$ x $\boldsymbol p$ ected value of a random variable f is defined as

$$
\mathbf{E}[f] = \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^*} x \cdot \Pr[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) = x] = \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^*} p_x \cdot x.
$$

Alternatively, we can compute expected value as

$$
\mathbf{E}[f] = \sum_{y=1}^{\infty} \Pr[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) \ge y] - \sum_{y=-\infty}^{-1} \Pr[\omega \in \Omega : f(\omega) \le y]
$$

$$
= \sum_{y=0}^{\infty} (1 - F(y)) - \sum_{y=-\infty}^{-1} F(y).
$$

Corresponding proof

Left area

Markov's inequality

For every non-negative random variable $\Pr\left[f(\omega)\geq \alpha\right]\leq \frac{\mathbf{E}[f]}{\alpha}$.

Jensen's inequality

Let x be a random variable. Then for every convex-cup function f

 $\mathbf{E}[f(x)] \leq f(\mathbf{E}[x])$

and for every convex-cap function g

 $\mathbf{E}\left[g(x)\right] \geq g(\mathbf{E}\left[x\right])$.

These inequalities are often used to get lower and upper bounds.

Corresponding proof

Note that it is sufficient to ^give ^a proof for sums with two terms.

Variance

Variance characterises how scattered are possible values

$$
\mathbf{D}[f] = \mathbf{E}[(f - \mathbf{E}[f])^{2}] = \mathbf{E}[f^{2}] - \mathbf{E}[f]^{2}.
$$

Usually, one also needs standard deviation

$$
\boldsymbol{\sigma}\left[f\right]=\sqrt{\mathbf{D}\left[f\right]}\enspace.
$$

Chebyshev's inequality assures that

$$
\Pr\left[|f(\omega) - \mathbf{E}[f]| \geq \alpha \cdot \boldsymbol{\sigma}[f]\right] \leq \frac{\mathbf{D}[f]}{\alpha^2}
$$

Proof of Chebyshev's inequality

Let $g = (f$ Markov's inequality $-\mathbf{E}\,[f])^2.$ Then by definition $\mathbf{D}\,[f]=\mathbf{E}\,[g]$ and we can apply

Entropy

Shannon entropy

Entropy is another measure of uncertainty for random variables. Intuitively, it captures the minimal amount of bits that are needed on average todescribe a value of a random variable $X.$

Shannon entropy is defined as follows

$$
H(X) = -\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^*} p_x \cdot \log_2 p_x = -\mathbf{E} [\log_2 \Pr[X = x]]
$$

It is straightforward but tedious to prove

$$
0 \le H(X) \le \log_2 |\text{supp}(X)|
$$

where the *support* of X is defined as $\text{supp}(X) = \left\{x \in \{0, 1\}^* : p_x > 0\right\}.$

Conditional of entropy

Conditional entropy is defined as follows

$$
H(Y|X) = -\mathbf{E}_{X,Y} [\log_2 \Pr[Y|X]]
$$

Now observe that

$$
H(X,Y) = -\mathbf{E}_{X,Y} [\log_2 \Pr[X \wedge Y]]
$$

= $-\mathbf{E}_{X,Y} [\log_2 \Pr[X] + \log_2 \Pr[Y|X]]$
= $-\mathbf{E}_X [\log_2 \Pr[X]] - \mathbf{E}_{X,Y} [\log_2 \Pr[Y|X]]$
= $H(X) + H(Y|X)$.

Mutual information

Recall that entropy characterises the average length of minimal description. Now if we consider two random variables. Then we can describe themjointly or separately. *Mutual information* captures the corresponding gain

$$
I(Y : X) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y)
$$

Evidently, mutual information between independent variables is zero:

$$
I(Y : X) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X) - \underbrace{H(Y|X)}_{H(Y)} = 0.
$$

Similarly, if X and Y coincide then

$$
I(Y : X) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X) - \underbrace{H(Y|X)}_{0} = H(X) .
$$

Min-entropy. Rényi entropy

Shannon entropy is not always descriptive enoug^h for measuring uncertainty. For example, consider security of passwords.

 \triangleright $\,$ Obviously, we can just try the most probable password. The corresponding uncertainty measure is known as *min-entropy*

$$
H_{\infty}(X) = -\log_2 \max_{x \in \{0,1\}^*} \Pr\left[X = x\right]
$$

 \triangleright $\,$ Often, we do not want that two persons have coinciding passwords. The corresponding uncertainty measure is known as *Rényi entropy*

$$
H_2(X) = -\log_2 \Pr[x_1 \leftarrow X, x_2 \leftarrow X : x_1 = x_2]
$$

where x_1 and x_2 $_{\rm 2}$ are independent draws from the distribution X . Hypothesis Testing

Standard setting

The best way to model secrecy is hypothesis testing.

There are several types of hypotheses:

- \triangleright simple hypotheses $\mathcal{H} = [s\stackrel{?}{=} s_0]$
- \triangleright complex hypotheses $\mathcal{H} = [s \stackrel{?}{=} s_0 \vee s \stackrel{?}{=} s_1 \vee \ldots \vee s \stackrel{?}{=} s_k]$
- ⊳ *trivial hypotheses* that always hold or never hold.

Simple hypothesis testing

Simple hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 and \mathcal{H}_1 observable variable $x \leftarrow f(s)$. Consequently, an adversary A that can
also see hat we was been there is 2ℓ and 2ℓ $_1$ always determine the distribution of the choose between two hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 and \mathcal{H}_1 can do two types $_1$ can do two types of errors:

- \triangleright probability of *false negatives* $\alpha(\mathcal{A}) \doteq \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(x) = 1 | \mathcal{H}_0 \right]$
- \rhd probability of *false positives* $\beta(\mathcal{A}) \doteq \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(x) = 0 | \mathcal{H}_1 \right]$

The corresponding aggregate error is $\gamma(\mathcal{A}) = \alpha(\mathcal{A}) + \beta(\mathcal{A}).$

Various trade-offs

^A reoccurring task in statistics is to minimise the probability of false positives $\beta(\mathcal{A})$ so that the probability of false negatives $\alpha(\mathcal{A})$ is bounded.

The most obvious strategy is to choose a trade-off point η and define

$$
\mathcal{A}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, \text{if } \Pr[x|\mathcal{H}_0] < \eta \cdot \Pr[x|\mathcal{H}_1] \\ 0, \text{if } \Pr[x|\mathcal{H}_0] > \eta \cdot \Pr[x|\mathcal{H}_1] \\ \text{throw a } \rho\text{-biased coin, otherwise} \end{cases}
$$

Neyman-Pearson Theorem. The likelihood ratio test described aboveachieves optimal $\beta(\mathcal{A})$ for any bound $\alpha(\mathcal{A}) \leq \alpha_0$. The aggregate error $\gamma(\mathcal{A})$ is minimised by choosing $\eta=1$ and using a fair coin to break ties.

Statistical distance

Formally, statistical distance is defined as re-scaled ℓ_1 -distance

$$
\mathrm{sd}_x(\mathcal{H}_1, \mathcal{H}_1) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum_x |\mathrm{Pr}\left[x|\mathcal{H}_0\right] - \mathrm{Pr}\left[x|\mathcal{H}_1\right]|
$$

but it is straightforward to see

$$
\mathsf{sd}_x(\mathcal{H}_0, \mathcal{H}_1) = \max_{\mathcal{A}} \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(x) = 0 | \mathcal{H}_0\right] - \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(x) = 0 | \mathcal{H}_1\right] ,
$$

$$
\mathsf{sd}_x(\mathcal{H}_0, \mathcal{H}_1) = 1 - \min_{\mathcal{A}} \gamma(\mathcal{A}) .
$$

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Computational distance

Although the best likelihood ratio test minimises the aggregate error $\gamma(\mathcal{A})$, it is often infeasible to use it:

- \triangleright the description of the corresponding decision border is too complex,
- \triangleright it is infeasible to compute $\Pr\left[x|\mathcal{H}_0\right]$ and $\Pr\left[x|\mathcal{H}_1\right]$.

Therefore, we must consider properties of optimal t -time test algorithms instead. The corresponding distance measure

$$
\mathsf{cd}^t_x(\mathcal{H}_0, \mathcal{H}_1) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \text{ is } t\text{-time}} |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(x) = 0 | \mathcal{H}_0] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(x) = 0 | \mathcal{H}_1]|
$$

is known as *computational distance*. Evidently

$$
\lim_{t\to\infty} \mathsf{cd}_x^t(\mathcal{H}_0,\mathcal{H}_1)=\mathsf{sd}_x(\mathcal{H}_0,\mathcal{H}_1) \ .
$$