
IND SEM Proof Explained

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Theoretical Background

Semantic security



Formal definition

Consider the following games:

 $\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G}_{0}^{\mathcal{A}} & \mathcal{G}_{1}^{\mathcal{A}} \\ \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{0} \\ \boldsymbol{g}' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(f(\boldsymbol{s})) \\ \text{return } [\boldsymbol{g}' \stackrel{?}{=} \boldsymbol{g}(\boldsymbol{s})] \end{aligned} \qquad \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{0} \\ \boldsymbol{g}' \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{g}'} \Pr\left[\boldsymbol{g}(\boldsymbol{s}) = \boldsymbol{g}'\right] \\ \text{return } [\boldsymbol{g}' \stackrel{?}{=} \boldsymbol{g}(\boldsymbol{s})] \end{aligned}$

Then we can define a true guessing advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{f,g}^{\mathsf{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}_0^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}_1^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right]$$
$$= \Pr\left[\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_0 : \mathcal{A}(f(\mathbf{s})) = g(\mathbf{s})\right] - \max_{\mathbf{g}'} \Pr\left[g(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{g}'\right]$$

$\mathsf{IND} \Longrightarrow \mathsf{SEM}$

Theorem. If for all $s_i, s_j \in \text{supp}(S_0)$ distributions $f(s_i)$ and $f(s_j)$ are (t, ε) -indistinguishable, then for all t-time adversaries \mathcal{A} :

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sem}}_{f,g}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$$

Note that

 \triangleright function g might be randomised,

- \triangleright function $g: S_0 \to \{0, 1\}^*$ may extremely difficult to compute,
- \triangleright it might be even infeasible to get samples from the distribution S_0 .

Proof in Small Steps

Mixture of distributions

Consider a following sampling algorithm

GetSample() $\begin{bmatrix} i \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \\ s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i \\ return \ s \end{bmatrix}$

where \mathcal{D} is a distribution over the set $\{0, 1, \ldots, t\}$ and $\mathcal{S}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{S}_t$ are just some distributions. Then

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{GetSample}() = s_0\right] = \sum_{i_0=0}^t \Pr\left[i \leftarrow \mathcal{D} : i = i_0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{i_0} : s = s_0\right]$$

Classical sampling idiom (1/2)

We can reverse the process. Assume that s is sampled from the distribution S and let $g: S \to \{0, 1, \dots, t\}$ be a deterministic function. Then

$$\Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : s = s_0\right] = \sum_{i_0=1}^t \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : g(s) = i_0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[s_0 | g(s) = i_0\right]$$

where by definition

$$\Pr[s_0|g(s) = i_0] = \frac{\Pr[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : s = s_0 \land g(s) = i_0]}{\Pr[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : g(s) = i_0]}$$

Classical sampling idiom (2/2)

Let now \mathcal{D} be the distribution over $\{0, 1, \ldots, t\}$ such that

$$\Pr\left[i \leftarrow \mathcal{D} : i = i_0\right] = \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : g(s) = i\right]$$

and let \mathcal{S}_{i_0} be defined so that

$$\Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i : s = s_0\right] = \Pr\left[s_0 | g(s) = i_0\right] .$$

Then the output od the sampling procedure GetSample() coincides with the distribution \mathcal{S} .

Slightly modified security game

Let \mathcal{D} and $\mathcal{S}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{S}_t$ be the distributions defined in the previous slide. Then we can rewrite the game \mathcal{G}_0 without changing its meaning:

$$\mathcal{G}_{0}^{\mathcal{A}}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} i \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \\ s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{i} \\ g' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(f(s)) \\ \text{return } [g' \stackrel{?}{=} i] \end{bmatrix}$$

In other words ${\mathcal A}$ must distinguish between following hypotheses

$$\mathcal{H}_0 = [i \stackrel{?}{=} 0], \mathcal{H}_1 = [i \stackrel{?}{=} 1], \dots, \mathcal{H}_t = [i \stackrel{?}{=} t]$$

It is a guessing game between many hypotheses.

Computational distance between hypotheses

Let \mathcal{A} be a *t*-time algorithm that must distinguish hypotheses \mathcal{H}_i and \mathcal{H}_j . Then the corresponding security games are following

$$\overline{\mathcal{G}}_{i}^{\mathcal{A}} \qquad \qquad \overline{\mathcal{G}}_{j}^{\mathcal{A}} \\ \begin{bmatrix} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{i} & \text{and} \\ \text{return } \mathcal{A}(f(s)) & & \\ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{j} \\ \text{return } \mathcal{A}(f(s)) \end{bmatrix}$$

In other words

$$\Pr\left[\overline{\mathcal{G}}_{i}^{\mathcal{A}}=0\right]=\sum_{s_{0}\in\operatorname{supp}(\mathcal{S}_{i})}\Pr\left[s\leftarrow\mathcal{S}_{i}:s=s_{0}\right]\cdot\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(f(s_{0}))=0\right]$$

Double summation trick

For obvious reasons

$$\sum_{s_0 \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{S}_i)} \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_i : s = s_0\right] = 1 = \sum_{s_1 \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{S}_j)} \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j : s = s_1\right]$$

Consequently

$$\begin{split} &|\Pr\left[\overline{\mathcal{G}}_{i}^{\mathcal{A}}=0\right]-\Pr\left[\overline{\mathcal{G}}_{j}^{\mathcal{A}}=0\right]|\\ &\leq \sum_{\substack{s_{0}\in \mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{S}_{i})\\s_{1}\in \mathrm{supp}(\mathcal{S}_{j})}} \Pr\left[s\leftarrow\mathcal{S}_{i}:s=s_{0}\right]\cdot\Pr\left[s\leftarrow\mathcal{S}_{j}:s=s_{1}\right]\underbrace{|\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(f(s_{0}))=0\right]-\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(f(s_{1}))=0\right]|}_{\leq\varepsilon}}{\leq\varepsilon}\\ &\leq\varepsilon \end{split}$$

and thus $\operatorname{cd}_x^t(\mathcal{H}_i, \mathcal{H}_j) \leq \varepsilon$.

Summary

Since modified \mathcal{G}_0 is nothing more than guessing game between many hypotheses $\mathcal{H}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{H}_t$ that are (t, ε) -indistinguishable, we have proven the claim for deterministic functions g.

Average-case \leq worst-case(1/2)

For the final proof step, assume $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{sem}}_{f,g}(\mathcal{A}) > \varepsilon$ for some randomised function

$$g: \mathcal{S}_0 \times \Omega \to \{0, \dots, t\}$$

Now by definition

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{f,g}^{\mathsf{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_0, \omega \leftarrow \Omega : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s,\omega)\right] - \max_{g'} \Pr\left[g(s) = g'\right]$$

Now

$$\Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{0}, \omega \leftarrow \Omega : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s, \omega)\right]$$
$$= \sum_{\omega_{0} \in \Omega} \Pr\left[\omega \leftarrow \Omega : \omega = \omega_{0}\right] \cdot \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{0} : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s, \omega_{0})\right]$$
$$\leq \max_{\omega_{0} \in \Omega} \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{0} : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s, \omega_{0})\right]$$

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Average-case \leq worst-case(2/2)

Let $g_0: \mathcal{S}_0 \to \mathbb{Z}$ be a deterministic function $g_0(s) = g(s, \omega_0)$ where

$$\omega_0 = \operatorname*{argmax}_{\omega_0 \in \Omega} \Pr\left[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_0 : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s, \omega_0)\right]$$

Then by construction

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sem}}_{f,g}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sem}}_{f,g_0}(\mathcal{A})$$

and thus we can indeed observe only deterministic functions.

QED