


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# Ethnicity

**Ethnic Diversity  
and Ethnic Studies**



Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (University of Latvia)

# ETHNICITY

## Ethnic Diversity and Ethnic Studies

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**Ethnic Diversity and Ethnic Studies**

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**Martin Ehala, Anastassia Zabrodskaja**

### **MEASURING ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY OF THE LARGEST ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE BALTIC STATES (II)**

This article presents the results of a large-scale quantitative study of the ethnolinguistic vitality of major ethnic groups in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and interprets the results for possible ethnic identity processes in the Baltic countries. Ethnolinguistic vitality is understood here as an ethnic group's potential for collective action. Vitality processes are considered short-term (one to five years) and intragenerational. Ethnic identity is understood here broadly as a collective identity that is shared by a group that is functioning or able to function as a society. Ethnic identity processes (segregation, assimilation and consolidation) are long-term (minimum 20 years) processes. The analysis revealed significant differences in the vitality of ethnic groups in three countries. The vitalities of Estonians and Lithuanians are highest, while the Latvians' vitality is slightly lower. As for the Russian minorities, the vitality is highest in Latvia and lowest in Lithuania. In Estonia, the vitality of the Russian-speaking population is slightly lower than in Latvia, particularly in north-east Estonia, and it is quite low in rural areas and small settlements. The Poles in Lithuania and Latgalians in Latvia have the lowest vitalities. The results suggest a continuation of segrega-

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tion of Russians in Estonia and Poles in Lithuania. Due to low intergroup discordance between Lithuanians and Russians, the Russian community in Lithuania is likely to assimilate, as are the Latgalians in Latvia. The Latvian-Russian situation resembles an unstable equilibrium: the vitality profiles of Latvians and Russians could lead either towards consolidation or separation. The beginning of the article was in *Ethnicity*, 2013, No.1 (8).

**Key words:** identity, vitality, majority, minority, Baltic countries

#### 4. Results of the study

In this part, first the results are presented on each factor (**PSD**, **D**, **U** and **R**) of a theoretical vitality model separately, and then the results of a combination of factors for measurement vitality (**V**) are given. A short description of questions measuring each factor and indicators of reliability statistics are given (a Cronbach's alpha coefficient).

##### 4.1. Perceived Strength Differential

The Perceived Strength Differential (**PSD**) section was comprised of 20 questions, ten of which measured how strong the minority group perceived itself ( $S_{we}$ ), and ten more measuring how they compared themselves to the majority ( $S_{they}$ ). Questions about in- and out-groups were formulated in parallel and were asked alternately. For example, a Russian-speaking informant was asked: "How much are Russian culture and traditions appreciated in the Estonian society?", and "How much are Estonian culture and traditions appreciated in the Estonian society?" The same questions were addressed to Estonians, only in reverse order. The questions touched upon situation, level of prevalence and future prospects of culture, language, mass media and education; number and popularity of ethnonational cultural and economic elite; and number and material condition of the respondent's population group in the country. In Latvia and Lithuania, we investigated three ethnic groups; in this block, there were 30 questions (ten more questions about the second out-group ( $S_{they2}$ ) were added). For example, in the questionnaire for Latgalian Latvians, there were equally formulated questions on the capacity of the group in connection with, alternately, Latgalian Latvians ( $S_{we}$ ), Latvians ( $S_{they1}$ ) and Russians ( $S_{they2}$ ).

In our research, the reliability level of almost all the groups of questions was quite high: the level of the Cronbach's alpha coefficient exceeded 0.7 (indicating how high the correlation between the variables forming the scale was, i.e. the factor of internal constancy or internal uniformity

was measured). Cronbach's alpha shows how great the correlation between different statements present within the same group is. The higher the value's index, the stronger the questions are related one to another, forming a single whole, and to which a general name (a category) can be given. A general rule is the following: the questions relate one to another if the index of Cronbach's alpha is equal to or larger than the value 0.7 (Cronbach 1971). High internal uniformity of questions allows for the calculating, on the basis of questions of one group, of an average value by means of which the scale is formed, marking a range of answers. All theoretical variables taken as a basis of the research assume working with a scale, and therefore internal uniformity was measured for all blocks of questions. Use of a scale is also why the results of the research are not presented for each question separately: first, the content of the block of questions on each variable is described and, for further comparison, only data given by the generalized scale is presented.

The Cronbach's alphas of perceived strength differential scales were generally quite high. Of the 22 scales, only in one case was the value of an alpha quite low – 0.571. This scale was the one from the evaluation by Lithuanian Russians of Lithuanians' potential. The evaluation scale of the capacity of the Russian-speaking group by Latgalian Latvians also showed low internal uniformity (0.641). Two other scales were a little lower than 0.7 (Latvians' evaluation of Latvian Russians – 0.679, and of Latgalian Latvians – 0.683). In the other 18 scales, the alpha values were very high (> 0.7).

As the deviations were insignificant, the average values on all blocks of questions were calculated. In order to make the numerical indicators more easily understandable, they were transformed from the initial scale (1 – very strong ... 7 – very weak) to a standard scale (0 – very weak ... 1 – very strong). Therefore, it is possible to consider each result as a percentage of absolute power, which was equal to 1. Perceived strength differential was calculated as  $S_{we} - S_{they}$ , and fell within the interval from -1 (very weak) to +1 (very strong). If the result of a calculation equals 0, it means that groups are perceived as equal among themselves. Results of the perceived strength of in- and out-group (or out-groups in the case of Latvia and Lithuania) are presented in Table 9.

**Table 9. Evaluation of perceived strength of ethnic groups**

	Estonia		Latvia			Lithuania		
	Estonians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latgalian Latvians	Lithuanians	Russians	Poles
$S_{we}$	0.72	0.45	0.66	0.51	0.44	0.74	0.49	0.50
$S_{they}$	0.49	0.74	0.55	0.70	0.72	0.54	0.78	0.79
$S_{they2}$			0.35	0.35	0.54	0.44	0.43	0.50

Analysing the results of self-perception by the ethnic groups, there are quite high indices of estimates by Lithuanians (0.74), followed by Estonians (0.72); the indicator for the Latvians is much lower (0.66). It is difficult to define precisely how such self-images reflect the real situation, i.e. to what extent they are applicable. It is possible to assume that Latvians have objective reasons for feeling weaker as an ethnic group, but our purpose is not the analysis of the objectivity of perception. However, previous studies on vitality have often showed that public perception deviates in the direction of overestimation or underestimation of own group (Harwood et al. 1994).

Next, we will consider the estimates given to the out-group ( $S_{they}$ ). In questionnaires for the Baltic titular nations, the external group was the local Russian-speaking community, and in questionnaires for the minority groups, it was the titular group. From an objective point of view, it is possible to assume that Latvian Russian-speakers are the strongest group, followed by the Russian-speaking community of Estonia, and the Lithuanian Russian-speakers can be considered the weakest. Considering the values given by the titular respondents, they reflect this conclusion only partially. Latvians considered their Russian-speaking community so strong that the result turns out to be the highest in the Baltic States (0.55), and this seems to reflect the real situation in Latvia. At the same time, Estonians saw the Russian-speaking community as surprisingly weak (0.49). While the assessment of Estonians seems more or less realistic, Lithuanians obviously overestimated the strength of their Russian-speaking group (0.54), as their perception practically coincides with how Latvians see the Russian group in Latvia. A more realistic estimate would be equal to the Polish community of Lithuania, which Lithuanians saw as much weaker (0.43).

Analysing the values assigned by minorities to the titular nations, all

three Russian-speaking communities evaluated them higher than themselves: Lithuanians were positioned as the strongest group (0.78), Estonians were slightly weaker (0.74), and Latvians a little weaker (0.70). Poles estimated the strength of Lithuanians even more highly (0.79), and Latgalian Latvians estimated Latvians as stronger (0.72) in comparison to how Latvian Russian-speakers evaluated Latvians.

Taking a more informative approach than a simple estimation of separate group strength, it is possible to calculate the perceived strength differential ( $S_{we} - S_{they}$ ). This indicator expresses the perception of an ethnic group of its collective power and prestige in society (see Table 10).

**Table 10: Perceived strength differential**

we → they	PSD
Latvians → Latgalian Latvians	0.30*
Lithuanians → Poles	0.30
Estonians → Russians	0.23
Lithuanians → Russians	0.19
Russians → Latgalian Latvians	0.15
Latvians → Russians	0.10
Russians → Poles	0.07
Poles → Russians	0.00
Latgalian Latvians → Russians	-0.10
Russians → Latvians	-0.20
Russians → Estonians	-0.29
Russians → Lithuanians	-0.29
Poles → Lithuanians	-0.29
Latgalian Latvians → Latvians	-0.29

\*The scale ranges from 1.0 (maximum superiority) to -1.0 (maximum inferiority)

In analysing these results, it is evident that Estonians' perceived their group as much stronger in comparison with Russians (0.23); Lithuanians lagged a little behind (0.19). First of all, Lithuanians seemed to consider Russian-speakers to be quite a strong group. The result of the Latvians is the lowest, approaching zero (0.10). The data show that all minority groups, except for Latvian Russian-speakers, felt equally weak in comparison with the titular nations (-0.29). Latvian Russian-speakers felt rather stronger (-0.20), which is not surprising, considering the fact that this is the biggest Russian-speaking community in the Baltic States.

As for the relative strength of minorities, Lithuanian Russian-speakers and Poles felt that they were almost equal (0.07 and 0.00), and Latvian Russians and Latgalian Latvians saw Latvian Russians as a stronger group (0.15 and -0.10). Latvians felt that they were stronger in comparison with Latgalian Latvians (0.30), as was true of Lithuanians in comparison with Poles (0.30).

Undoubtedly, the most interesting result is that Estonians felt that their ethnic strength was prevalent in comparison with the strength of the local Russian-speaking community. In Lithuania, Lithuanians assessed the strength of Russian-speakers as much higher than would be expected from the small size of the group. To understand where such views originate from, we will next address the analysis of single questions.

The evaluation by Lithuanians of their strength varied in the block of questions from 0.96 ("How much is Lithuanian used in media?") to 0.58 ("How would you estimate the population of the group?"). It became clear that Lithuanians estimated the group as strong on language, cultural and economic indicators, but weak in terms of how much the Lithuanian culture in Lithuania was appreciated, how active and strong Lithuanians were in the Lithuanian society and how influential, in comparison with the present situation, the Lithuanian language and culture in Lithuania would be in 20–30 years.

Over all, Lithuanians estimated the strength of Russian-speakers in Lithuania, in relation to some questions, quite highly. The highest rating was given to Russian use in mass media (0.65) and its importance in the Lithuanian society (0.60); the lowest was the estimated strength of the Russian community in the demographic plan (0.43) and on its prospects in 20–30 years (0.40).

For comparison, it is necessary to mention that Estonians estimated the prevalence of Russian-speaking mass media much lower (0.51), and the importance of Russian in Estonia especially low (0.42). Latvians rated the prevalence of Russian-speaking mass media as the highest (0.70), but the importance of Russian for them was almost as low as for Estonians (0.44). Thus, Lithuanians felt a weakness in their own ethnic group because of the perceived wide prevalence of Russian-speaking mass media, and also the high importance of Russian in Lithuania. This result reflects not so much the power of the Lithuanian Russian-speaking community, but a greater orientation of Lithuania towards Russia, in comparison with Latvia and Estonia. Such a "Russian" orientation was apparently also partially caused by a weak or absent sense of danger in relation to the Russian language and the local Russian-speaking community.

#### 4.2. Perceived inter-ethnic discordance

To a large extent, inter-ethnic relations are based on a shared understanding of reality constructed in the public discourse and influenced by personal experiences. Inter-ethnic discordance expresses the perceived illegitimacy of intergroup power relations, as well as distrust towards the out-group.

As legitimacy is a highly abstract notion, the items that were used to measure this variable were designed so that they would be maximally context sensitive, i.e. having direct relevance for this particular intergroup setting. Questions affecting the legitimacy focused on the status of the Russian language in the country and the fairness in the treatment of the Russian minority. For example, in Estonia, the statements were as follows: "Russian should be the second official language in Estonia"; "The situation of the Russian community in Estonia corresponds to international norms"; "Concerning the Russian community, the Estonian Republic follows European democratic principles". In Latvia and Lithuania, the statements were the same, only the name of the country was changed accordingly. In the questionnaires for Poles and Latgalian Latvians, the questions concerning legitimacy were changed so that they would express the most relevant questions about legitimacy and power relations from the perspective of the respective minorities. For example, in a Polish questionnaire, the following statements were provided: "Polish should be the second official language in the south-eastern part of Lithuania"; "Vilnius and its region should be a Polish autonomous region". In a questionnaire for Latgalian Latvians, instead of a question on official language status, the next statement was suggested: "Latgalian should be the regional language in the Latgalian region". There were also such questions as: "Latvia should provide Latgalian as a language of instruction in the Latgalian region" and "The Latgalian region should get the status of cultural autonomy in Latvia". A 10-item questionnaire was designed to measure legitimacy and trust. All of the items used Likert-type scales, allowing for the following choices: 1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – somewhat agree, 4 – somewhat disagree, 5 – disagree, and 6 – strongly disagree. The validity and reliability of the scale were tested in a pilot study (Zabrodska 2009a).

The same questionnaire was used in all three studies to measure the perception of legitimacy and trust among the titular nation, the local Russian community and the second biggest ethnic group (in the case of Latvia and Lithuania). In regard to the validity and reliability of such a comparative approach, the Cronbach alphas were at acceptable levels: 0.72, and in some

cases over 0.80. As for the characteristics of six statements, then four were of positive feature, for example: "Estonian Russian-speakers are helpful as cultural go-betweens"; "Estonian Russian-speakers are reliable"; "Estonians are regarded well by Estonian Russian-speakers"; and "Estonian Russian-speakers wish to cooperate with Estonians". Two statements expressed negative attitudes, for example: "Russian-speakers behave according to the influence of their lowest instincts" and "Russian-speakers are aggressive".

For statements expressing inter-ethnic illegitimacy, the Cronbach alphas varied because three different options of a questionnaire were used. In the studies related to Latvia and Estonia, in only one sample was the value of Cronbach alpha lower than 0.7. This was a sample of Estonian Russian-speakers, where the alpha of the questions was equal to 0.665. In all samples of the Lithuanian study, the alpha of the legitimacy questionnaire did not exceed the index 0.7. In three cases, it was higher than 0.6 and in a sample of Lithuanian Russians only 0.578. This shows that, in the Lithuanian context, the question about the Russian language as a possible state language is not closely associated with the treatment of the Russian minority. It also shows that the questions about the status of the Polish language as a possible second official language and the questions about Polish autonomy are equally unrelated to the concept of legitimacy. The subsequent analysis of comparative data obtained in Lithuania should therefore be treated with caution.

Comparative data on the perception of legitimacy and trust are presented in Table 11. In Latvia and Lithuania, titular nations show two results: the first two rows express the variables in relation to the Russian minority, and the second two towards the second minority (Latgalian Latvians and Poles, respectively).

**Table 11: Perception of legitimacy and trust (1 — low... 6 — high)**

	Estonia		Latvia			Lithuania		
	Estonians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latgalian Latvians	Lithuanians	Russians	Poles
legitimacy	4.78	2.78	4.43	2.31	3.36	4.80	3.77	3.90
trust	3.06	3.16	3.29	3.37	2.74	2.76	2.60	3.00
legitimacy,			3.43			4.83		
trust,			2.21			3.32		

In analysing the results of legitimacy and distrust, it was clear that the titular nations of the Baltic countries perceive the situation as quite legitimate: the highest data on the legitimacy are among the Lithuanians, especially in relation to the Polish minority (4.83); the lowest are among Latvians, especially with regard to Latgalian Latvians (3.43). These results are not surprising, since they reflect the national state system, including the attitude towards minority rights in the Baltic States since their formation. The relatively low index in relation to Latgalian Latvians clearly indicates the fairly positive attitude of Latvian respondents to a wider acceptance and use of the Latgalian language, which is in some contradiction with the official language policy in Latvia, with its rather rigid attitude towards improving the status of Latgalian.

In comparison with the titular nations, the assessment of the legitimacy of power relations by Baltic ethnic minorities was lower. The lowest result was among Latvian Russians (2.31), and the highest results among ethnic minorities in Lithuania (Russians 3.77 and Poles 3.9). The evaluation given by Latgalian Latvians (3.36) was close to the neutral mid-scale (3.5). We can therefore suggest that "small" minorities (Poles and Lithuanian Russians) see the ethnic situation in their country as legitimate or almost legitimate (Latgalian Latvians). The larger Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, by contrast, see the situation as significantly more illegitimate, mainly because of the attitudes towards the status of Russian as a possible official language.

In analysing the indices of distrust, it is important to highlight the fact that in all cases they were below 3.5, which characterizes a neutral attitude according to the scale. Therefore, in each case, the average result indicates the trust relationship to members of out-groups. Perhaps we are dealing with a simple desire to express the conventional position, but the result may also be explained by the fact that there is very little grassroots hostility amongst the general population of the Baltic countries, despite the fact that on the political level strong language is quite common. A similar phenomenon has also been noticed in multilingual environments of Transylvania (Brubaker et al. 2006).

In terms of indications of distrust, there are quite high indices of the Lithuanian respondents against the Polish (3.32), in comparison with indicators of the Poles against the Lithuanians (3.0). Also, the relatively high indices of the mutual distrust in the pair "Latvian Russians – Latvians" (3.37 and 3.29) should be noted. The results clearly demonstrate that the inter-ethnic situation in Latvia is the most intense in comparison with its Baltic neighbours.

In order to compile indicators of legitimacy and trust in one general indicator – the perceived intergroup discordance – both indicators were moved to the scale of measurement 0... 1, and reformatted so that a neutral attitude (i.e., the absence of negative or positive feelings) merged with the zero on the scale (it is possible to familiarize with a technique in more detail in Ehala & Zabrodskaja 2011).

As a result of such transformations, the discordance scale D ranges from **-0.25**, which expresses the most positive attitude to the out-group, to **+0.75** – the most negative attitudes towards the out-group. A null result is a neutral attitude. All values of D in descending order, from highest to lowest, are given in Table 12 (arrows indicate the direction of the discordance between specific groups).

**Table 12: Indicators of discordance**

<b>we → they</b>	<b>D</b>
Russians → Latvians	0.15
Lithuanians → Poles	0.14
Estonians → Russians	0.12
Latvians → Russians	0.10
Lithuanians → Russians	0.07
Russians → Estonians	0.06
Latgalian Latvians → Latvians	-0.04
Poles → Lithuanians	-0.06
Russians → Lithuanians	-0.09
Latvians → Latgalian Latvians	-0.09

To conclude, intergroup discordance is felt in the highest degree by Russian-speakers towards Latvians, followed by Lithuanians in their attitude towards Poles. Given the small size of the Polish community and its negative discordance in relation to the Lithuanians (-0.06), this index is somewhat unexpected and clearly reflects the sensitivity of Lithuanians to the problems of Lithuania's territorial integrity (in relation to Poland). A relatively unexpected result is the low average discordance of Russians in Estonia. The positive attitude of Latvians, as a majority group, towards Latgalian Latvians shows, of course, their commitment to greater recognition of the Latgalian language. On this question, Latvian respondents were more supportive and positive in relation to Latgalian Latvians than indicated by the official language policy in Latvia.

The strong interrelatedness of these factors provided strong support for

the initial assumption that the perceptions of legitimacy, discrimination and intergroup attitudes form one tightly related and mutually reinforcing set of beliefs that can be summarised in one measure: intergroup discordance.

### 4.3. Utilitarianism

To measure the utilitarianism and traditionalism of ethnic groups, a questionnaire of 14 statements was created, of which seven concerned utilitarianism and seven traditionalism. The structure of the questionnaire was inspired by the Portrait Values Questionnaire (see Schwartz et al. 2001), in which study participants were asked to mark on a six-point Likert scale to what extent they were similar to the described person (1 – very much similar to me ... 6 – completely distinct from me). Among the statements concerning utilitarianism, were the following: "He/she is open to all that is new", "He/she finds that traditional ways of living and old-fashioned values have become a hindrance to progress". The statements about traditionalism included the following: "He/she considers it important to follow the practices of his/her culture", and "It is important to him/her that his/her children should value these customs and traditions, too".

To test the questionnaire, we carried out two pilot studies among students of Tallinn University. Altogether 154 students participated in the pilot study, 69% of which considered their mother tongue to be Estonian and 28% Russian. On the basis of the results, we measured the reliability and internal uniformity of factor structure. It was found that statements fell into two separate semantic groups, as had been predicted when the questionnaire was created, but there seemed to be no significant correlation between the two groups. This means that utilitarianism and traditionalism did not form two extremes of one scale. Rather, we were dealing with two separate scales. On the basis of the results of the pilot study, from the initial questionnaire ten statements were selected, of which six measured utilitarianism and four traditionalism.

The results of the main research confirmed the internal uniformity of both questionnaires. The values of Cronbach's alpha for the scales of traditionalism were in all cases 0.7 or above; for the utilitarianism scale, they were above 0.7 for the ethnic groups of Latvia and Estonia. In the Lithuanian research, they were slightly lower: Lithuanians' result was 0.573, Lithuanian Russians' 0.636 and Poles 0.639. To find out why in Lithuania the questionnaire showed low internal uniformity, it is necessary to carry out detailed high-quality research. However, in the Lithuanian case, the values of Cronbach's alpha were not so low that the calculation of the average

value was meaningless. It is necessary to carefully interpret the Lithuanian results, especially in comparison with other Baltic countries.

The comparative average values for the groups of questions of utilitarianism and traditionalism are presented in Table 13. This is a six-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates the lowest level of utilitarianism or traditionalism and 6 the highest.

**Table 13. Levels of utilitarianism and traditionalism among ethnic groups in the Baltics**

	Estonia		Latvia			Lithuania		
	Estonians	Russians	Latvians	Russians	Latgalian Latvians	Lithuanians	Russians	Poles
utilitarianism	3.55	3.47	3.48	3.59	3.81	3.86	3.63	3.74
traditionalism	4.58	4.26	4.20	3.99	4.53	4.71	4.35	4.45

Data comparison shows that the titular groups in Estonia and Latvia expressed rather balanced utilitarianism (the average value is close to the neutral point 3.5), and Latgalian Latvians and ethnic groups of Lithuania showed an obvious tendency to utilitarianism. At the same time, Lithuanians displayed the highest level of traditionalism among the Baltic nations. Let us also note that the level of traditionalism among all Baltic people was essentially above the neutral value of the scale, 3.5. This indicator is the lowest in the case of Latvian Russians (3.99).

Rather high values on the scale of traditionalism and small distinctions between the indicators of the studied groups mean that the values of the U index, which usually reflect a tendency for assimilation and language shift, are rather small, and the tendency for culture and language preservation dominates. As explained in Section 1.4, the index of U expresses an interval between utilitarianism and traditionalism and is calculated as follows:  $U = (U_t - Tr) + 1$ . This means that, in the case of the maximum traditionalism and absolute lack of utilitarianism,  $U = 0$ . When  $U_t$  and  $Tr$  values are equal,  $U = 1$  and, in the case of maximum utilitarianism and an absolute lack of traditionalism,  $U = 2$ . All of the values of the U index are given in Table 14 in decreasing order, from most "utilitarian" to most "traditional".

**Table 14. Indicators of the U index among ethnic groups in the Baltic States**

Ethnic group	U
Latvian Russians	0.92
Lithuanian Russians	0.86
Lithuanian Poles	0.86
Latgalian Latvians	0.86
Latvians	0.85
Estonian Russians	0.84
Lithuanians	0.83
Estonians	0.79

A comparison of the indicators of the U index makes it clear that all of the peoples of the Baltic countries gravitated to traditionalism (the values of the U index are lower than 1.0). Latvian Russians had the highest indicator of U and Estonians the lowest. At the same time, it is surprising that the general variability in the U index in the case of different ethnic groups was extremely low – only 6 % on the scale – and, for the most of groups, the values of the U index were almost identical. It is also interesting that the standard deviations of the U index remained in all cases in the interval from 0.23 till 0.29. This means that the internal variability of the U index among ethnic groups was much higher than the difference between them. In all groups, there were subgroups which were much more utilitarian or more traditional than others. However, the analysis of these features lies outside the scope of the present article.

#### 4.4. Inter-distance

The variable of distance R is comprised of two components:  $R_1$  expresses the distance in terms of the choice of language, and  $R_2$  shows a respondent's assessment of his or her cultural distance in relation to both groups.

For the measurement of the  $R_1$  (language choice), ten questions were taken from a questionnaire of a language contacts network (Landry et al. 1996), concerning language use in the family, with friends and with colleagues; with officials and service personnel; and in the sphere of mass media and cultures. For example: "In which language do you communicate

with your friends?”. Responses were given on a seven-point Likert scale, with the following range: 1 – only in language *y*; 2 – mainly in language *y*; 3 – more in language *y* than in language *x*; 4 – equally in language *y* and language *x*; 5 – more in language *x* than in language *y*; 6 – mainly in language *x*; 7 – only in language *x*. An eighth option was also added: “in other languages”. Language *y* indicates the language in which a representative of an ethnic group usually communicated, and language *x* is the language of an out-group (group “they”). In the Estonian questionnaire, there was only one scale (Estonian-Russian or Russian-Estonian, depending on nationality); in the questionnaires in Latvia and Lithuania, each respondent had to note his or her language distance on both scales because there were three groups participating in the study (Latvians, Russians and Latgalian Latvians; Lithuanians, Russians and Poles, respectively). In all cases, the internal uniformity of the scales was very high (the values of all Cronbach’s alphas were higher than 0.7).

For the measurement of cultural distance  $R_2$ , existing models (Babiker et al. 1980; Fukurawa 1997; Shenkar 2001; Chirkov et al. 2005) were analysed and a block of ten questions concerning the perception of intercultural differences in culinary preferences, clothes styles, religious beliefs, mentality and traditions of communication was selected. The questions in this block included: “In terms of physical appearance, how different are the Ys and you?”, “In terms of religious beliefs, how different are the Ys and you?”, and “How easy is it to communicate with a Y in relation to studies/work?”. The responses were analysed on a seven-point Likert scale, which represented a choice from the maximum difficulty of communication (1) to the minimum (7). The internal uniformity of this questionnaire was very high: in most cases the Cronbach’s alphas were higher than 0.8; only in four cases were the Cronbach’s alphas lower than 0.8, although all were higher than 0.75.

The high internal uniformity of both  $R$  components made it possible to calculate the  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  indices, and the  $R$  index as their arithmetic average. To make the results easier to understand, all variables were converted to a scale of 0 (the minimum distance) to 1 (maximum distance). The results for  $R_1$  are presented in Table 15.

**Table 15. Inter-ethnic distance among Baltic people on language choice**

Language <i>x</i> → language <i>y</i>	$R_1$
Russians → Polish	0.99
Lithuanians → Polish	0.98
Russians → Latgalian	0.98
Latvians → Latgalian	0.96
Latgalian Latvians → Russian	0.93
Lithuanians → Russian	0.89
Estonians → Russian	0.86
Russians → Estonian	0.81
Latvians → Russian	0.77
Russians → Latvian	0.75
Russians → Lithuanian	0.61
Poles → Lithuanian	0.41
Poles → Russian	0.40
Latgalian Latvians → Latvian	0.38

In analysing  $R_1$ , or the results of language usage in the case of the titular nations, it becomes clear that the biggest distance occurred with Latgalian Latvians and Poles: the majority of representatives of the titular nations (respectively, Latvians and Lithuanians) did not use their languages in everyday life at all (the  $R_1$  values are equal to 0.96 and 0.98). Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians used much more Russian: Latvians more often than the others ( $R_1 = 0.77$ ), and Lithuanians less ( $R_1 = 0.89$ ). In the case of the Russian communities, interesting distinctions occurred: Lithuanian Russians used Lithuanian rather widely ( $R_1 = 0.66$ ), Latvian Russian-speakers lagged behind them a little in the use of Latvian, and most of the Estonian Russian-speakers less often resorted to the state language ( $R_1 = 0.81$ ). These indicators perfectly illustrate the isolation of the Russian-speaking community in Ida-Viru County, while Latvian Russian-speakers seem to be more connected with Latvians in the language domain.

The data also allow us to compare the family language use of Russian-speaking communities in Germany and Norway (Mendzheritskiy and Bagreeva 2013). Mendzheritskiy and Bagreeva report that 72.9% of Russian-speakers in Germany and 61.4% in Norway use Russian as the single home language. In Latvia, 69% of Russian-speakers used only Russian to communicate with their family members; in Estonia and Lithuania it was 75%. This indicates that, in the Baltic countries, where the Russian-speaking communi-

ties remained after the breakdown of Soviet Union, they maintain their home language better than in countries that they have recently immigrated to.

It is necessary to consider that the presented results reflect the assessment given by participants in a study on language behaviour, instead of objectively measured real language use. Judging by  $R_1$  values, Latgalian Latvians and Lithuanian Poles are the most assimilated linguistically; as their results show that in certain situations they used the majority language more often than their native language (the value 0.5 indicates an equal use of both languages, while a smaller value indicates language assimilation). Considering the language practice accepted between minorities, Latgalian Latvians and Russians do not use each other's languages, whereas Poles are assimilated into the Russian language a little more than into Lithuanian.

In comparison with language distance, the cultural distance between the peoples of the Baltic countries was noticeably smaller: 0.5 or less (see Table 16).

**Table 16. Inter-ethnic distance among Baltic people on culture**

Us → them	$R_2$
Latvians → Russians	0.51
Estonians → Russians	0.50
Russians → Latvians	0.49
Russians → Latgalian Latvians	0.49
Russians → Estonians	0.48
Latgalian Latvians → Russians	0.47
Lithuanians → Polish	0.44
Lithuanians → Russians	0.42
Russians → Polish	0.42
Russians → Lithuanians	0.38
Poles → Russian	0.37
Latvians → Latgalian Latvians	0.40
Poles → Lithuanian	0.32
Latgalian Latvians → Latvian	0.31

It is interesting to note that the results in Latvia and Estonia (close to 0.5) were much higher than the indicators for Lithuania (close to 0.4). Obviously, the more difficult situation of the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and Latvia, which led respondents to say that they felt distinctions more strongly, is reflected here. It is surprising that Lithuanians felt a sharp difference with Poles (0.44), since due to religious proximity the feeling of a smaller distance with Poles, in comparison with Russians, would be more

expected. Again, the results were influenced by the inter-ethnic discordance which Lithuanians feel towards Poles more strongly than in relation to Russians. But the Poles of Lithuania considered themselves very close to Lithuanians in culture (0.32), closer than to Russians (0.37). Latgalian Latvians felt the least distance from Latvians, which is expected considering that Latgalian Latvian identity is a regional identity within Latvian national identity. To sum up, it turns out that the identity of the Lithuanian Polish community and its dynamics are quite complicated: this group is rather strongly located both in the Lithuanian and in Russian language spaces, and feels very similar to Lithuanians, while Lithuanians obviously wish to separate themselves from Poles.

To account for both language and cultural distance between groups,  $R$  values as an average of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  were calculated. Distances are given in Table 17 between all groups, and the direction of the arrows shows in relation to what group the value  $R$  is presented. As before, the maximum distance is expressed by the value 1, and the minimum is 0.

**Table 17. Perceived inter-ethnic distance between ethnic groups in the Baltic countries**

We → they	$R$
Latvian Russians → Latgalian Latvians	0.74
Lithuanians → Poles	0.71
Lithuanian Russians → Poles	0.70
Latgalian Latvians → Latvian Russians	0.70
Estonians → Estonian Russians	0.68
Latvians → Latgalian Latvians	0.68
Lithuanians → Lithuanian Russians	0.65
Latvians → Latvian Russians	0.64
Estonian Russians → Estonians	0.64
Latvian Russians → Latvians	0.62
Lithuanian Russians → Lithuanians	0.49
Poles → Lithuanian Russians	0.38
Poles → Lithuanians	0.37
Latgalian Latvians → Latvians	0.34

Considering Table 17, it is clear that, in relation to a small minority (Latgalian Latvians and Poles), other groups felt a big distance, but that small minorities felt proximity to the majority, i.e. they wished to share the linguistic and cultural identity of the majority. In the case of the Poles, the same occurred concerning Russian language and identity. The biggest feeling of mutual distance between the titular nation and Russians was observed in Estonia, which reflects the relative social isolation of Russians in Estonia. The Latvian and Latvian Russian communities felt rather close to each other, which points to the stronger integration of Russians than in Estonia. In Lithuania, the situation of Lithuanians and Russians was asymmetric and similar to the model of a small minority: the titular nation felt a greater distance than the minority. However, the asymmetry was not very big: this means that the Lithuanians felt that the Russians were quite similar to themselves. Such a situation increases the probability of the assimilation of this minority.

#### 4.5. Vitality

The vitality of ethnic groups was calculated with the help of two formulas:

$$(1) V = U \cdot ((S_{we} - S_{they}) + D) / R$$

$$(2) V = R \cdot ((S_{we} - S_{they}) + D) / U$$

Formula (1) was used when PSD ( $S_{we} - S_{they}$ ) was less than 0. Negative PSD is common to minority groups, but not always and not unconditionally. Formula (2) was used when PSD was equal to 0 or exceeded 0. Such a result was characteristic of members of majority groups.

Because of the formulas' mathematical properties, the scale's negative and positive halves are not symmetrical on numerical values, though in terms of rating it is possible to distinguish the same degrees. Degrees of vitality scales along with their description are presented in Table 18.

Table 18. Degrees of vitality scale

	Values of V	Description
High vitality	> 1.5	Extreme ethnocentrism
	0.6 ... 1.5	Strong ethnocentrism
	0.3 ... 0.6	Moderate ethnocentrism
	0.1 ... 0.3	Weak ethnocentrism
Low vitality	0 ... 0.1	Stable vitality
	0 ... -0.1	
	-0.1 ... -0.2	Weakly shifting
	-0.2 ... -0.3	Moderately shifting
	-0.3 ... -0.4	Strongly shifting
	< -0.4	Extremely shifting

It is important to note that the values of V are very closely connected with ethnocentrism: the higher the vitality (V), the more ethnocentric the ethnoses. In the case of a very low V, the centre of the collective identity of a group moves from the ethnic group to the majority group, which, in essence, means identity change and assimilation. In some ways, it is possible to consider the scale of vitality to be a scale for the measurement of ethnocentrism, where negative values indicate negative ethnocentrism. In the case of negative ethnocentrism, members of a group would like to disassociate themselves from their identity and to strive for some other more prestigious identity (mostly the majority identity). Undoubtedly, from the point of view of group maintenance, ethnocentrism is important, although high ethnocentrism is accompanied, as a rule, by a number of undesirable side effects.

Table 19 presents the average values of vitality (V) of all the ethnic groups of the Baltic countries, and also the values of the variables based on the calculation of vitality (during the calculation process, 1.0 was added to the value R, otherwise the formula would not work, but, for greater clarity, the scale of R is presented in an interval of 0 ... 1 in Table 19).

Table 19: Vitality of ethnic groups in the Baltic countries

Ethnic group	V	PSD	D	U	R	Characterisation
Lithuanians → Poles	0.91	0.3	0.14	0.83	0.71	Strong ethnocentrism
Estonians → Estonian Russians	0.87	0.23	0.12	0.79	0.68	
Lithuanians → Lithuanian Russians	0.65	0.19	0.07	0.83	0.65	Moderate ethnocentrism
Latvians → Latvian Russians	0.55	0.10	0.10	0.85	0.64	
Latvians → Latgalian Latvians	0.42	0.30	-0.09	0.85	0.69	Stable vitality
Latvian Russians → Latvians	0.06	-0.20	0.15	0.92	0.62	
Estonian Russians → Estonians	-0.08	-0.29	0.06	0.84	0.64	Moderately shifting
Latgalian Latvians → Latvians	-0.20	-0.29	-0.04	0.86	0.34	
Lithuanian Russians → Lithuanians	-0.22	-0.29	-0.09	0.86	0.49	
Poles → Lithuanians	-0.24	-0.29	-0.06	0.86	0.37	

The values of **V** in Table 19 should be interpreted based on the scale presented in Table 18. In the centre is the zero point, which separates groups with low vitality (**V** is below zero) from those with high vitality (**V** is above zero). It is necessary to consider that **V** expresses vitality only on an axis of two measured groups. Therefore, in interpreting a **V** value, it is always necessary to consider the context in which it was calculated.

Proceeding from this, it is possible to argue that, of the Baltic ethnic groups, the most ethnocentric are the Lithuanians in relation to the Poles, and the Estonians in relation to the Russians. The degree of their ethnocentrism can be characterized as strong. Such a position expresses the rather rigid border between the majority group and the corresponding minority, and an obvious feeling of their superiority, with low interest and sympathy.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the ethnocentrism of Lithuanians in relation to Russians was much lower, as was the ethnocentrism of Latvians concerning Latvian Russians. Such a position indicates a slightly greater readiness to communicate and cooperate with the minority. The ethnocentrism of Latvians in relation to Latgalian Latvians appeared to be even lower. This is, however, quite explainable: Latvians simply perceive Latgalians as a part of the group (i.e. as Latvians). The low ethnocentrism indicates a readiness to recognize the right of Latgalian Latvians to use a variant of the language and to have an autochthonic culture.

Judging by the results of the research, the Russian communities of Latvia and Estonia are in a stable situation. As minorities, they do not aspire to assimilation. However, this is not true of Latgalian Latvians, nor of Poles and Lithuanian Russians. The corresponding values indicate the extent of the average threat to their vitality, i.e. a result of their clear desire to belong to the country's majority group. Unfortunately, this depends not only on them, but also on the vitality of members of the majority group (see Table 20) or, to be more exact, on its ethnocentrism, since these processes occur not only intra-group, but also inter-group. An interpretation of the study results and the conclusions drawn on their basis about possible paths of development of inter-ethnic processes in the three Baltic countries are presented below.

## 5. Interpretation of the results

From the point of view of this conceptual model, vitality is the readiness of members of an ethnic group to engage in collective action. This does not indicate real political activity, but only the readiness for social mobilisation. Basically, the model starts with the assumption that the higher the vitality, the easier it is for a group to be mobilised, and that the lower the vitality, the more members prefer to separate from a group and from its collective identity. Thus, vitality as a willingness to engage in collective action is inherently a social and psychological phenomenon based on ideas of a group's power shared by its members, the character of the inter-ethnic relations in society and the dominant system of values.

At the same time, vitality as a notion of inter-ethnic relations directly influences the relations themselves, i.e. objective reality. This means that, considering the objective reality and the vitality of ethnic groups, it is possible to predict various aspects of inter-ethnic relations. Naturally, vitality is inherently dynamic, and large changes in vitality can change inter-ethnic processes considerably.

As perception of reality is formed generally as a result of communication, there is always some bias in this perception. Because of this, the vitality of a group may be much higher or lower than would be predicted on the basis of the objective analysis of an inter-ethnic situation. A short description of the "strength" of the Baltic ethnic groups, from an objective perspective, was presented in Section 2.1, and a review of representations about the situation shared by group members was presented in Section 4. We will consider the most significant deviations revealed by our research between objective and perceived reality, and also their possible consequences. Then we will consider in more detail the possible influence of vitality on inter-ethnic processes.

### 5.1. Vitality and objective reality

From an objective viewpoint, the situations in Latvia and Estonia would seem to be rather similar: in both societies there are quite numerous Russian minorities: in Estonia 29%, and in Latvia 33% of the total populations. In Lithuania, the titular nation prevails, as the share of the Russian minority is only 7% and the Polish 6%. If vitality reflected reality objectively, the *V* values would be in close correlation with the size of the minority groups in society. However, the results presented in the previous section differ from those forecast in many important ways.

For example, Lithuanians feel quite high discordance in relation to Poles, which exceeds the real danger of this group to the society as a whole; the distance between Poles and Lithuanians is also perceived by the latter as quite big. Considering the fact that the Polish community of Lithuania is similar in terms of culture and religion to Lithuanians, such a high *D* value is, certainly, greater than would be expected. Obviously, this result is influenced by the historical conflicts between Lithuania and Poland.

The high vitality of Estonians and their ethnocentrism in relation to Russians are also disproportionately high. Considering that Russians constitute 29% of the Estonian population, the expected result would be closer to the vitality of Latvians in relation to Latvian Russians. But the result is more similar to the situation between Lithuanians and Poles. Here, the historical parallel clearly appears and it may be the most important influence. Though there are several times more Russians in Estonia than Poles in Lithuania, the perceived strength differential by Estonians was approximately the same as that of Lithuanians in relation to local Poles. Such a perception by Estonians may have been partially caused by the separation of the Russian-speaking community in Ida-Viru County and the general economic backwardness of this region.

One of the major deviations occurred in the vitality of Lithuanians in relation to local Russians. It was found that Lithuanians felt their prevalence over Russian-speakers to a lesser extent than over Poles; this degree of prevalence was also lower than the corresponding indicator of Estonians in relation to Estonian Russians. This is an essential deviation which is necessary to examine. It may be connected with the fact that, in the questionnaire, many questions concerned the Russian language and culture as a whole, instead of connections with the Russian communities. The Lithuanians noted the significant role of Russian in mass media and culture, but they were influenced primarily by mass media and culture coming from the Russian Federation, not by local actors. Thus, the results do not reflect so much the position of Russians in Lithuania as the general attitudes towards the Russian language, culture and Russian-speaking mass media. In the Lithuanian results, the general proximity of Lithuanians to Russians was also reflected in the low discordance (*D*) and small inter-ethnic distance (*R*). Combining these factors, such attitudes directly influence the stability of the Lithuanian Russian-speaking community (we will deal with this subject in more detail below).

The perception of vitality and its components by Latvians can be seen as the most objective. The results show the relative equality of the Latvian and Russian communities, a little higher discordance than in the other Baltic States, and a relatively greater inter-ethnic proximity. The vitality of Latvians in relation to Latgalian Latvians also seems to be objective because it follows from the clear superiority in group size and the positive relationship to the minority. Such attitudes influence the stability of Latgalian Latvians in two ways (see below).

The estimates of the vitality of Latvian Russian-speakers were also in line with the objective reality. The *V* value is positive, which points to the stability of the Latvian Russian community and to a distinctly perceived ethnocentrism. The estimates of the vitality of the Estonian Russian-speakers were much lower, mainly in comparison with the relative power of the Estonian and Russian communities. Estonian Russians perceived themselves to be approximately as weak as the Latgalian Latvians, Poles and Lithuanian Russians, which in comparison with objective reality is undoubtedly an underestimation.

In the feelings of Estonians and Russians, reality was essentially distorted, giving the impression of a considerable superiority of Estonians and a marginalisation of the Russian community. Lithuanians' feeling of distance and discordance in relation to Poles was exaggerated, whereas both were absent in the feelings of local Poles towards Lithuanians. Therefore, we are

dealing with asymmetric perception, in which, apparently, the attitudes of Lithuanians towards Poland are reflected. At the same time, Lithuanians overestimated the vitality of Russians, and here the influence of the rather neutral relationship with Russia is evident.

The influence of the above-mentioned deviations on inter-ethnic processes seems to be quite clear, but its direction is not the same in all cases and depends on the particular context.

### 5.2. Influence of vitality on inter – ethnic processes

Though vitality also expresses the readiness of an ethnic group for collective action, processes occurring in reality depend not only on the representations shared by the group members, but also on the attitudes of other groups in a society, and their relation to the same variables. In other words, real processes depend on the vitality of both minority and majority groups and related factors.

For example, such majority group which sees itself as being much stronger than the minority, and sees the situation as being quite legitimate (high PSD and D) tend to have assimilative influence to the minority in cases when the minority perceives itself similar to the majority (low R) and, in terms of its attitudes is utilitarian and pragmatic (high U). In such a situation, the majority is confident of its power and, at the same time, fairly open to the minority, which makes the majority to accept the shifting members of the minority without problems.

If the majority group, possessing the same level of power, perceives itself to be culturally distinct from the minority (high R) and, at the same time, is very traditional (low U), such a majority acts to segregate the minority, because the majority is not ready to accept the assimilation of members of the minority. As the value of V depends on the values of R and U and D, the majority group with high value of V is more segregative than such a majority whose V value is less.

Therefore, if the majority group sees itself as being only a bit stronger than the minority and its discordance in relation to the minority is insignificant (small PSD and D), then such a group does not pressure the minority to assimilate. Depending on the R and U values, such a situation promotes either minority integration (low R and high U), or its separation (high R and low U). Integration will occur when groups are similar culturally, and if the majority is open to the cultural changes which integration can bring about. If the difference in the strength of the groups is small, the closer intergroup contact does not result in assimilation of the strong minority, but it retains its cultural features. If the majority group feels a large inter-

ethnic distance and, at the same time, is traditional (high R and low U), it is quite probable that it will not wish to mingle with a strong minority and consequently will prefer separation of the minority into an autonomous or even independent territory.

In the case of the minority, the influence of the V value as a whole is similar: the greater the vitality of the minority, the more probable that it will aspire to preservation of its cultural and language identity, or to achievement of autonomy. In the case of a low V value, a lot depends on the R and U indicators: if cultural differences are large and the level of traditionalism is high (as in some Islamic-origin immigrant communities living in Europe), the process of assimilation will be difficult and improbable.

Such properties of vitality and its components make it possible to use the V value for an estimation of acculturation and assimilation processes occurring in a society. Furthermore, we take as a basis the model of acculturation processes by John Berry (1997). This model distinguishes five types of acculturation: integration, segregation, separation, marginalisation and assimilation. In Table 20 these processes are defined through the functions of the V values of the majority and minority groups.

**Table 20. Acculturation processes as a function of majority and minority groups' vitality**

		Majority	
		V > 0	V ≈ 0
Minority	V ≈ 0	segregation	integration or separation
	V < 0	marginalisation	assimilation

Table 20 shows that a high V in the majority leads to segregation or marginalisation of the minority, depending on whether the V value of the minority is close to zero or considerably below it. A rather low V value for the majority indicates possible separation of the minority, integration of the two groups or minority assimilation, depending on how high or low of a V value the minority has.

Interpreting the vitality results of the ethnic groups in the Baltic countries (see Table 19) in the given framework (see Table 20), it is possible to draw some conclusions about inter-ethnic processes. Based on the V values of the Estonians and Estonian Russians, it is clear that the tendency prevailing in society is segregation, which most likely will continue if there are no

major shifts in the *V* values. The connection between the Lithuanian and Polish communities indicates a marginalisation of the Poles, while the *V* values in connection with the relationship between Lithuanians and Russians point to the assimilation of Russian-speakers.

The *V* indicators of Latvians and Russians are closest to the combination predicting integration or separation. It is very probable that a change in this situation depends on whether the *D* value increases or decreases. In the first case, the ethnic borders will become stronger and there will be little possibility of cooperation, which, considering the comparable strength of both groups, may lead to an increase in the rights of the Russian community in Latvia or even to its autonomy. The destiny of Latgalian Latvians is most likely assimilation or, at best, integration if they manage to maintain a high level of traditionalism and their uniqueness from other Latvians.

If the results in general are accurate and reliable, they can be quite helpful in understanding the nature of the distinctions between the inter-ethnic situations which have developed during the last decades in the Baltic States, and also in confirming the significance of vitality as an important variable influencing a situation. Of course, these data can only be used to assess explicit integration attitudes, not implicit attitudes. Therefore, it would be very useful to study the interrelationship of implicit acculturation attitudes (see Zak and Cohen 2013) to see whether the Lithuanian Russians and Poles also show higher levels of implicit attitudes towards identity shift.

Considering that the Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia are rather big, it is possible to assume that, in both states, the relationship between the majority and the minority should be similar. However, contemporary events have showed that the Latvian Russian community is much more active in upholding its rights. It is possible to explain this distinction by the quite low vitality of Estonian Russians. Such low vitality does not reflect the sustainability of the Estonian Russian community objectively; it is a quite strong and sustainable community, but its perceptions about its strength and sustainability (PSD) are low. On the basis of the results, we cannot give a definite answer to the question of why the vitality of Russian-speakers in Estonia is so small; for this purpose, it would be necessary to carry out a thorough analysis of qualitative data. At the same time, it is quite probable that the Estonian Russian community is not (and most likely will not be in future) ready for collective action.

The quite low vitality of Lithuanians in relation to the local Russian community provides some explanation of their readiness to accept minority members into their ranks. The low vitality of Lithuanians is also the reason that Lithuanian Russians assimilate so quickly, whereas the aggra-

vated inter-ethnic borders with Poles do not allow Poles to assimilate (not forgetting the topic of the legitimacy of Poles' position in Lithuania, which has been controversial during the whole post-Soviet period).

On the basis of the above-mentioned factors, it is possible to assume that if there are no significant changes in vitality values in the near future, the scenarios of development for the inter-ethnic relations in the three Baltic States will be the following. In Estonia, the segregation of the Russian community will continue; in Latvia, though some readiness of Russians for integration has been shown, a strengthening of intensity may lead the Russian community to achieve autonomy; for the Russian-speaking community of Lithuania, assimilation seems the most likely outcome, which would be satisfactory to both the Russian-speaking community and the representatives of the titular nation. Latgalian Latvians may improve their status if they manage to raise their vitality and demand more rights. Lithuanian Poles will remain marginalised, unless they completely renounce their identity and shift to Lithuanian.

With the discussions presented above in mind, let us now turn to the findings of empirical studies on vitality of Russian-speakers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

## 6. Ethnolinguistic vitality clusters among Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic States

To allow for data analysis, the mean values for each conceptual group were calculated. These values were used to compute the *V* values for each respondent. As the authors were interested not in the *V* values of individual respondents, but rather in the *V* differences between subgroups within the Russian-speaking community, two-step cluster analysis was conducted using the variables PSD, R, U, D and V as input. The two-step cluster analysis is a statistical tool for revealing natural groupings (or clusters) within a dataset that would not otherwise be apparent. Unlike the traditional clustering methods, two-step analysis makes it possible to analyse large data files. By comparing the values of a model-choice criterion across different clustering solutions, the procedure can automatically determine the optimal number of clusters. This makes it possible to explore the data for a best solution by not imposing the number of clusters arbitrarily beforehand. However, for the Latvian Russians sample, the two-step cluster analysis led to a very general two cluster solution that was not very informative. For this sample, the k-means cluster analysis was used.

The results show that Russian-speakers living in Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania do not form single unitary categories which have a uniform value system and attitudes. Instead, the Russian-speaking community in each country is quite diverse in respect to their beliefs and attitudes. Several different subgroups can be distinguished that differ from each other in a number of parameters.

### 6.1. Russian-speakers living in Estonia

As a result, among Estonian Russian-speakers five vitality clusters emerged (for a general overview see Table 21), ranging from the Medium Low Vitality group, consisting of 10% of the respondents, to the Discordant group, with the highest vitality rate (14% of the respondents). The majority of the respondents belonged to three groups, with stable vitality indices but differing from each other in the configuration of the measured variables. Although the clusters differ from each other in a statistically significant way, it should be noted that they are abstractions over a continuous set of data. Therefore, the descriptions of the clusters represent a prototype rather than a well-bounded set of similar individuals. Also, due to the form of the survey, the results are strictly synchronic, presenting a snapshot that does not reflect possible shifts between the subgroups. In reality, subgroup boundaries are vague and the sizes of the vitality clusters may change over time.

**Table 21. Five vitality clusters of Estonian Russians (The extreme values for each variable are given in italics.)**

	Medium Low Vitality	Stable Low Esteem	Stable Integrated	Stable Traditional	Discordant
% of the whole sample	10%	28%	22%	26%	14%
PSD ( $S_{we} - S_{they}$ ) -1.0... 1.0	<i>-0.46</i>	<i>-0.37</i>	<i>-0.21</i>	<i>-0.32</i>	<i>-0.07</i>
D -0.25... 0.75	<i>-0.03</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.17</i>	<i>0.25</i>
U 0... 2	<i>1.04</i>	<i>0.89</i>	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.98</i>
R 1.0... 2.0	<i>1.57</i>	<i>1.74</i>	<i>1.57</i>	<i>1.77</i>	<i>1.75</i>
V -2.5... 3.5	<i>-0.31</i>	<i>-0.15</i>	<i>-0.08</i>	<i>-0.05</i>	<i>0.10</i>

**The Medium Low Vitality cluster** was characterized by a high perceived ethnic weakness of Russian-speakers compared to Estonian-speakers ( $PSD = -0.46$ ). The members of this cluster did not perceive any discordance in relations with Estonian-speakers; in fact, their  $D$  ( $-0.03$ ) even indicates a slight favouritism toward the out-group, i.e. a tendency to see Estonian-speakers in a very positive light. In terms of their cultural values, this group can be considered to have a slight preference for utilitarianism versus maintaining traditions and heritage culture ( $U = 1.04$ ). The intergroup distance of this group from Estonian-speakers was the smallest in all five clusters, but still considerable ( $R = 1.57$ ). All these characteristics led to the lowest  $V$  value amongst the subgroups in this sample ( $-0.31$ ).

The following are the characteristics of a typical representative of this group:

- an Estonian citizen (65%; 1.20<sup>a</sup>),
- a University graduate (26%; 1.86),
- a private sector employee (49% 1.63),
- has an above average income (21%; 2.33),
- lives in an Estonian dominant town or in the countryside (60%; 2.31).

**The Stable Vitality Low Self-Esteem cluster** had a considerably higher  $V$  value ( $-0.15$ ) than the Medium Low Vitality group. This cluster's  $V$  value ( $-0.15$ ) is quite close to zero, indicating that the subgroup in general is maintaining their heritage. What makes this cluster special is that they have a clearly traditional value system ( $U = 0.89$ ) and a fairly large intergroup distance from Estonian-speakers ( $R = 1.74$ ). They have neutral attitudes towards Estonian-speakers ( $D = 0.06$ ), but perceive them as a considerably stronger group than Russian-speakers ( $PSD = -0.37$ ).

The following are the characteristics of a typical representative of the above group:

- over 60 years old (17%; 1.21),
- retired (21%; 1.31),
- stateless (28%; 1.27),
- university graduate (17%; 1.21),
- income slightly below average (34%; 1.42),
- lives in eastern Estonia (46%; 1.31).

**The Stable Vitality Integrated cluster** has a  $V$  value ( $-0.08$ ), indicating that the subgroup is stable in respect to  $V$ . This cluster has an even more traditional value system ( $U = 0.84$ ) than the previous one, and a similarly neutral attitude towards Estonians ( $D = 0.05$ ), but it differs from the Stable Low

Esteem group in its small intergroup distance from Estonians ( $R = 1.57$ , the smallest amongst the clusters) and in terms of a lesser perceived strength differential between Estonian- and Russian-speaking groups ( $PSD = -0.21$ ). All this means that this group is well integrated into the Estonian society, but has positive self-esteem and is maintaining its cultural and linguistic heritage.

Below are the characteristics of a typical representative of the group:

- under 40 years old (64%; 1.25),
- an Estonian citizen (79%; 1.46),
- works in the public sector (34%; 1.17) or a student (13%; 1.63),
- has an average income (68%; 1.26),
- lives in an Estonian dominant town or in the countryside (66%; 1.61).

**The Stable Vitality Traditional cluster** is characterized by the most traditional value system amongst the subgroups ( $U = 0.59$ ). This is accompanied by a distinct feeling of discordance towards Estonians ( $D = 0.17$ ) and the largest intergroup distance from Estonians ( $R = 1.77$ ). Their  $V$  is somewhat lower in terms of their low perceived intergroup strength differential ( $PSD = -0.32$ ), so that their overall  $V$  index ( $-0.05$ ) does not reach a positive value.

Characteristics of a typical representative may be stated as the following:

- 40–60 years old (52%; 1.49),
- a citizen of the Russian Federation (40%; 1.74),
- income below average (43%; 1.16),
- lives in Eastern Estonia (50%; 1.43).

**The Discordant cluster** is distinct from the rest of the groups in several respects. First, it considers Estonians and Russian-speakers to be almost equal in esteem ( $PSD = -0.07$ ), they have the highest perceived inter-ethnic discordance ( $D = 0.25$ ) and a high intergroup distance from Estonians ( $R = 1.75$ ). Their value system is well balanced between utilitarianism and traditionalism ( $U = 0.98$ ). All this adds up to a positive  $V$  value (0.1), indicating that this subgroup is vital, discordant and possibly ready to challenge the inter-ethnic power relations in Estonia.

Characteristics of a typical representative may be stated as the following:

- under 40 years old (70%; 1.37),
- stateless (33%; 1.50),
- income significantly below average (18%; 1.38),
- lives in eastern Estonia (45%; 1.29).

The results show that on the one hand, there are subgroups which have a tendency towards social mobility and integration, but not all of these subgroups are prone to language and identity shift. On the other hand, there are subgroups that have a clear preference for language maintenance but, as the quantitative analysis shows, only a small minority (the cluster Discordant, consisting of 14% of the sample) might want to challenge the current inter-ethnic power status quo in Estonia.

Over all, based on the quantitative analysis, it is evident that the maintenance of the Russian language and culture in Estonia is safe at present (see the relatively high intergroup distance ( $R$ ) scores and low Utilitarianism ( $U$ ) scores in Table 21 for most of the clusters), although there is some assimilation of Russian-speakers to the Estonian majority (the cluster of Medium Low Vitality, about 10% of the sample).

## 6.2. Russian-speakers living in Latvia

As a result, among Latvian Russian-speakers four vitality clusters emerged (for a general overview see Table 22), ranging from the Trustful utilitarianists group, consisting of 38% of the respondents, to the Discordant traditionalists group, with the highest vitality rate (7% of the respondents).

**Table 22. Four vitality clusters of Latvian Russians**  
(The extreme values for each variable are given in italics.)

	Trustful utilitarianists	Humble traditionalists	Discordant utilitarianists	Discordant traditionalists
% of the whole sample	38%	30%	25%	7%
PSD ( $S_{we} - S_{they}$ ) -1.0... 1.0	<i>-1.2</i>	<i>-.26</i>	<i>-.23</i>	<i>-.12</i>
D -0.25... 0.75	<i>-.01</i>	<i>.09</i>	<i>.34</i>	<i>.43</i>
U 0... 2	<i>1.16</i>	<i>.68</i>	<i>1.04</i>	<i>.67</i>
R 1.0... 2.0	<i>1.57</i>	<i>1.61</i>	<i>1.67</i>	<i>1.69</i>
V -2.5... 3.5	<i>-.10</i>	<i>-.06</i>	<i>.18</i>	<i>.85</i>

**Trustful utilitarianists** are characterised by a considerably utilitarian attitude ( $U = 1.16$ ) accompanied by slight out-group favouritism ( $D = -0.01$ ) and frequent usage of Latvian ( $R = 1.57$ ). Their  $V$  is the lowest amongst clusters ( $-0.10$ ). Typical members of this cluster are as follows:

- male (55%; 1.38),
- self-employed (8.5%; 1.33),
- workless (15.5%; 1.4),
- student (17.8%; 1.51).

**Humble traditionalists** are characterised by very traditional attitudes ( $U = 0.68$ ) accompanied by a distinct perception weakness of Russian-speakers in Latvia ( $PSD = -0.26$ ) and a very low discordance towards Latvians ( $D = 0.09$ ). Typical members can be characterised by the following features:

- female (72.1%; 1.2),
- higher education (40.7%; 1.28),
- retired (14.3%; 1.35).

**Discordant utilitarianists** are characterised by a distinct feeling of discordance ( $D = 0.34$ ) accompanied by slightly utilitarian attitude ( $U = 1.04$ ) and strong perception of weakness of Russian-speakers as compared to Latvians ( $PSD = -0.23$ ) and low usage of Latvian language ( $R = 1.67$ ). Many public sector employees belong to this cluster and people whose income is considerably below average, the data are as follows:

- public sector employee (23.8%; 1.31),
- worker in NGO (4.0%; 1.18),
- income considerably below average (30.7%; 1.29).

**Discordant traditionalists** have the highest feeling of discordance ( $D = 0.43$ ), accompanied by distinct traditionalism ( $U = 0.67$ ), usage of Latvian is low ( $R = 1.69$ ), and they have a perception of relative equality of strengths of Latvians and Russian speakers ( $PSD = -0.12$ ). Many people with vocational secondary education belong to this group, also people whose income is considerably below average:

- secondary (vocational) education (52.8%; 1.16),
- housewife (13.9%; 2.57),
- income considerably below average (25.0%; 1.05).

The data provide somehow expectedly echoed results with Estonian clusters. A higher level of discordance is felt by Russian-speakers whose monthly income is not high. These two groups of people do not use Latvian frequently. Thus, we could suggest that poor Latvian language knowledge limited their opportunities to get higher education in the official language in due time and now might be considered to be an obstacle in getting bet-

ter-paying work (that, in its turn, would assume a good knowledge of a state language and a higher education). One cannot suggest that Russian might be well-maintained by successful Russian-speakers who receive their higher education in the state language (this might be especially true because of the distinct number of females among humble traditionalists). Of course, the very traditional attitudes might facilitate heritage language and culture maintenance.

### 6.3. Russian-speakers living in Lithuania

As a result, among Lithuanian Russian-speakers four vitality clusters emerged (for a general overview see Table 23), ranging from the Pessimist utilitarianists group, consisting of 29.2% of the respondents, to the Threatened traditionalists group, with the highest vitality rate (16.7% of the respondents).

*Table 23: Four vitality clusters of Lithuanian Russians (The extreme values for each variable are given in italics.)*

	Pessimist utilitarianists	Cultural traditionalists	Practicing Russian-speakers	Threatened traditionalists
% of the whole sample	29.2%	22.7%	28.8%	16.7%
PSD ( $S_{we} - S_{they}$ ) -1.0... 1.0	-41	<i>-14</i>	<i>-22</i>	-42
D -0.25... 0.75	<i>-09</i>	<i>-15</i>	<i>-09</i>	<i>.01</i>
U 0... 2	<i>1.02</i>	.86	.86	.57
R 1.0... 2.0	1.45	<i>1.34</i>	<i>1.64</i>	1.53
V -2.5... 3.5	<i>-35</i>	<i>-18</i>	<i>-16</i>	<i>-13</i>

**Pessimist utilitarianists** characterised by a utilitarian attitude ( $U = 1.02$ ), accompanied by strong perception of weakness ( $PSD = -0.41$ ) and out-group favouritism ( $D = -0.09$ ). Lithuanian is used excessively ( $R = 1.45$ ). All these characteristics led to the lowest  $V$  value amongst the sub-

groups in this sample (-0.35). Many public sector employees with higher education as well as students belong to this cluster:

- public sector employee (32.4%; 1.6),
- student (17.6%; 1.42),
- on maternity leave (4.4%; 2.58),
- average income (57.4%; 1.13),
- vocational education (36.8%; 1.12),
- higher education (26.5%; 1.15).

**Cultural traditionalists** characterised by strongest out-group favouritism ( $D = -0.15$ ) and traditionalism ( $U = 0.86$ ). However, Russian is used less than Lithuanian in this cluster ( $R = 1.34$ ), but the Russian community is felt to be relatively less weak than in other clusters ( $PSD = -0.14$ ). Thus, cultural heritage is valued, but this does not transform to language maintenance. The Cultural traditionalists cluster had a considerably higher  $V$  value (-0.18) than the Pessimist utilitarianists group. This cluster is dominated by males, with low educational level and joblessness. Also many students belong here:

- male (52.8%; 1.14),
- basic or unfinished secondary education (13.2%; 1.71),
- workless (24.5%; 1.42),
- student (17%; 1.37).

**Practicing Russian-speakers** is the group which uses Russian the most amongst the clusters ( $R = 1.64$ ). They are traditionalists ( $U = 0.86$ ) and show out-group favouritism ( $D = -0.09$ ). This cluster is dominated by retired people with low educational level:

- secondary education or less (86.5%; 1.13),
- retired (32.8%; 1.7),
- private sector employee (29.9%; 1.27),
- income considerably below average (23.9%; 1.24).

**Threatened traditionalists** cluster has the highest  $V$  value amongst the clusters (-0.13). They are very traditionalist ( $U = 0.57$ ), have strong perception of Russian-speakers weakness compared to Lithuanians ( $PSD = -0.42$ ) and it is the cluster which does not have out-group favouritism ( $D = 0.01$ ). This group is dominated by females and business people, higher education is common as is unfinished basic education. The proportion of people with considerably lower than average income is large:

- female (61.5%; 1.15),
- unfinished basic education (5.1%; 1.96),
- higher education (38.5%; 1.63),
- self-employed (10.3%; 3.03),
- income considerably lower than average (25.6%; 1.33).

The Lithuanian results point out that language shift from Russian to Lithuanian is occurring, although one of such groups (Cultural traditionalists) value Russian culture. Russian-speakers in Lithuania showed out-group favouritism more often than Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia; this might be explained by a fact that Lithuania chose the so-called 'zero option', according to which Lithuanian citizenship could be granted to all persons who on the day of coming into force of the Law were legal permanent residents of Lithuania, irrespective of the grounds on which their residence rested (e.g. in contrast with Estonia where one must pass an official language test and have knowledge of the Constitution of the Estonian Republic and the Citizenship Act, see more in Zabrodskaja 2009b).

### Conclusions

The higher the ethnolinguistic vitality, the better the chances for the maintenance of a group over time, and the lower the vitality, the more likely it is to cease to exist through assimilation. The main focus of our article is on the dynamics of the ethnolinguistic vitality of the biggest ethnic groups living in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. An analysis of ethnolinguistic vitality properties shows that inter-ethnic relations in the three Baltic countries can be described as follows. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have quite stable ethnolinguistic vitality. In Estonia, the segregation of the Russian community is likely to continue. Latvian Russians have the highest vitality amongst the Russian-speaking communities in Baltic countries, which may lead to demands for higher status and more rights. For the Russian-speaking community of Lithuania, assimilation seems to be a satisfactory solution for both Russians and representatives of the titular nation. Latgalian Latvians might have an opportunity to improve their status if they can raise their vitality. Lithuanian Poles may remain marginalized, unless they completely renounce their own identity in favour of a Lithuanian identity. In general, the results of this study reflect inter-ethnic processes in the Baltic societies as they have been represented in numerous previous studies, but they also add some new comparative details.

As with any other theory, the vitality model that formed the core for this research project is based on some important conditions necessary for its practical use. Among them: a) measured attitudes reflect readiness for collective action; b) this action influences the assimilation of the maintenance of a group; c) a group's vitality is measured by the factors  $PSD$ ,  $D$ ,  $R$  and  $U$ ; and d) the mutual interconnection of the mentioned factors is as it was described in the vitality model. So, it is possible to consider the interpretation of the results presented by us as correct only if all the data

necessary for theory application are accurate. At the same time, the connection between the conditions of the theory and the results of the research is mutual: as far as the results coincide with reality, and the dynamics of real processes coincide with those predicted, the results allow for strengthening, specifying or changing provisions of the theory.

A cluster analysis of quantitative data revealed that the intensity of intergroup contact and professional advancement are the major factors that shape the acculturation orientations of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, modifying their vitality profile. The vitality of Latvian Russians is the highest and corresponds to their demographic strength. The vitality of Estonian Russians is lower than could be expected from their demographic strength. The vitality of Lithuanian Russians is low, corresponding to their demographic weakness. Consequently, it is not possible to talk about or assess the ethnolinguistic vitality of the whole Russian-speaking community in each Baltic country as a unit, as different subgroups display different tendencies in regard to culture and language maintenance or assimilation.

In general, the results of this research reflect the inter-ethnic processes taking place in the societies of the Baltics as they have been presented in numerous earlier studies. However, we have added to the existing body of facts a great deal of more detailed comparative information. Further qualitative research should help to confirm the accuracy of these details and, if necessary, will lead to modification of the model, providing more substantial information of how the respondents belonging to different vitality clusters orient towards their heritage culture and host society, how they forecast their ethnic identity dynamics over time and how they see future inter-ethnic relations.

The subsequent application of the described model in research on other inter-ethnic situations would help to test the universality of the model.

## Appendix

### Abbreviations:

X – Minority language (territory, culture etc.)

Y – Majority language (territory, culture etc.)

**NB! This version of the questionnaire is for those who self-identify as X.**

### General background questions

- 1) Gender: male, female
- 2) Age:
- 3) What ethnic group do you consider you belong to? (You can choose many options) X, Y, other (please specify)
- 4) What is your mother tongue? (You can choose many options): X, Y, other (please specify)
- 5) Where were you born? In X, Y, another country (please specify)
- 6) Where was your father born? In X, Y, another country (please specify)
- 7) Where was your mother born? In X, Y, another country (please specify)
- 8) What is your marital status: not married, in a non-official marriage, divorced or widow/widower
- 9) How many people share the same household with you?
- 10) What is your education level?
  - 1) unfinished basic
  - 2) basic or unfinished secondary education
  - 3) secondary education
  - 4) specialized secondary education or vocational training
  - 5) higher education or scientific degree
- 11) What is your employment status?
  - businessman or self-employed entrepreneur
  - employee in public sector
  - employee in private sector
  - employee in NGO
  - pensioner
  - unemployed
  - pupil or student
  - housewife
  - on maternity/paternity leave
  - other (please specify)
- 12) How would you characterize the economic situation in your family?
  - Considerably below average
  - Slightly below average

- Average
- Slightly above average
- Considerably above average

14) Where do you live now? (If more than one applies, please choose the main one)

- Town
- Town
- Parish
- Parish

### Section R

#### How do you use languages in everyday life?

Please answer the following questions using the scale below (you can choose two options if necessary).

Only in X	Mainly in X	More in X than in Y	Equally in X and Y	More in Y than in X	Mainly in Y	Only in Y	In another language
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

R01	In which language do you communicate with your family members?
R02	In which language do you communicate with your friends?
R03	In which language do you communicate with your colleagues (classmates or co-students)?
R04	In which language do you communicate in your hobby activities (arts circles, sports etc.)?
R05	In which language do you communicate in shops and service facilities?
R06	In which language do you communicate with strangers on a bus, in a street, in a shop?
R07	In which language are the TV programs that you watch?
R08	In which language are the radio broadcasts that you listen to?
R09	In which language are the newspapers that you read?
R10	In which language are the cultural events (e.g. concerts, theatre and festivals) that you attend?

How do you assess the cultural differences between X and Y? Please indicate your opinion on the scale.

1 - very different; 2 - different; 3 - more different than similar; 4 - hard to evaluate; 5 - more similar than different; 6 - similar; 7 - very similar.								
R11	In terms of visual appearance, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R12	In terms of lifestyle, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R13	In terms of life values, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R14	In terms of religious beliefs, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R15	In terms of dress style, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R16	In terms of daily food preferences, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R17	In terms of free time activities, how different are Ys and you?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 - very easy; 2 - easy; 3 - more easy than difficult; 4 - hard to answer; 5 - more difficult than easy; 6 - difficult; 7 - very difficult.								
R18	How easy is it to become a friend of a Y?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R19	How easy is it to communicate with a Y in relation to studies/work?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
R20	How easy is it to have an acquaintance who is a Y?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

### Sections G1 and G2

Please assess the strength of X language and culture in relation to Y language and culture. Indicate your choice on the scale (1...7).

1 (very much) -... - 7 (very little)								
G20	How much are X culture and tradition appreciated in the society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G10	How much are Y culture and tradition appreciated in the society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G22	How much is X language appreciated in the Y society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G12	How much is Y language appreciated in the Y society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 (very many) –... – 7 (few)								
G21	How many eminent talented people (e.g. writers, actors, artists, singers, scientists and journalists) are there among the X?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G11	How many eminent talented people (e.g. writers, actors, artists, singers, scientists and journalists) are there among the Y?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G23	How many wealthy employers and businessmen are there among the X?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G13	How many wealthy employers and businessmen are there among the Y?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G24	How much is X language used in media (e.g. newspapers, radio, TV and the Internet) in Y country?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G14	How much is Y language used in media (e.g. newspapers, radio, TV and the Internet) in Y country?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G25	How much is X language used in education (nurseries, schools and universities) in Y country?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G15	How much is Y language used in education (nurseries, schools and universities) in Y country?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 (quickly increasing) –... – 7 (quickly decreasing)								
G26	How would you estimate the changes in population of X (in Y country)?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G16	How would you estimate the changes in population of Y (in Y country)?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 (very active) –... – 7 (inactive at all)								
G27	How active and powerful are Xs in the Y society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G17	How active and powerful are Ys in the Y society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 (very wealthy) –... – 7 (not wealthy at all)								
G28	How <b>wealthy</b> are Xs in Y society?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G18	How <b>wealthy</b> are Ys?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1 (very strong) –... – 7 (not strong at all)								
G29	How strong will the X language and culture be in Y country in 20 to 30 years in comparison with the present?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G19	How strong will the Y language and culture be in Y country in 20 to 30 years in comparison with the present?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

### Section U

Below, a number of persons are characterized. Please indicate how similar the person portrayed by the statement is to you.

1 – very similar to me; 2 – similar to me; 3 – somewhat similar to me; 4 – somewhat different from me; 5 – different from me; 6 – very different from me.							
U01	It is important for him to make things on his own. He likes to be free and not to depend on others.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U02	He does not want to waste time on unimportant people and things that do not take him forward in life. It is important for him to concentrate on achieving his goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U03	Self-realization is more important to him than relations with people close to him. He is not afraid of ruining relations if they start to disrupt the fulfilment of his goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U04	Success in career is more important to him than friends and acquaintances. He would be ready to relocate if he got a lucrative job offer, even if it meant losing his existing social network.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U05	He is open to everything new. He finds that traditional ways of living and old fashioned values have become a hindrance to progress.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U06	He does not feel loyalty to his locale. He is ready to live and work anywhere if the conditions satisfy him.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U07	Following traditions is important to him. He considers abandoning family, religious or cultural customs inappropriate.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U08	He values his roots. He values his heritage culture and his birth community highly.	1	2	3	4	5	6

U09	He considers it important to follow the practices of his culture. It is important to him that his children value these customs and traditions, too.	1	2	3	4	5	6
U10	Linguistic and cultural purity is important to him. He tries to avoid foreign influences in his language and behaviour.	1	2	3	4	5	6

### Section D

How much do you agree with the following statements?

1 (totally agree); 2 (agree); 3 (rather agree); 4 (rather disagree); 5 (disagree); 6 (totally disagree).							
D01	X should be one of the official/regional languages in Y country.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D02	The duty of Y country is to support the maintenance of X language and culture.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D03	The situation of the X community in Y society corresponds to international norms.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D04	Concerning the X community, the Y country follows European democratic principles.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D05	Ys are helpful as cultural go-betweens.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D06	Ys are reliable.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D07	Xs are regarded well by Ys.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D08	Ys wish to cooperate with Xs.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D09	Ys behave under the influence of their lowest instincts.	1	2	3	4	5	6
D10	Ys are aggressive.	1	2	3	4	5	6

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### Endnotes

- a This index shows how many times the proportion of people belonging to this category is higher in this cluster than in the whole sample. For example, for 65%, 1.20 here means that in this cluster, there are 65% of those having Estonian Citizenship and this ratio is 1.2 times higher than the whole sample. This also means that in some other cluster the ratio of Estonian citizens should be less than in the whole sample. Therefore, the differences between clusters are large even if the deviations from the whole sample may not seem particularly large.

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Denis Kretalov

### DEFINING ROMA AS AN ETHNIC GROUP: PROBLEMATIC ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS

In the article author theoretically discusses and analyses the issues related to the definition and identification of the Romas "the ethnic group" taking into account cultural diversity, heterogeneity and local unique characters which considerably differentiates one Roma sub-group from another. Whether the similarities and differences among the representatives of Roma are sufficient to prove their belonging to one ethnic group? Various categories of the ethnic designation of Roma, such as several exonyms (Gypsy, čigāni etc.) and endonyms and its background in the European and Latvian contexts are also analysed in the article.

**Key words:** ethnic groups; Roma sub-groups; Construction of Roma identity; designation of Roma population;

The issues related to the definition and identification of the Roma as "the ethnic group" are complicated and they are not paid due attention in social sciences, especially in the national context because of their contradictory nature. On the one hand, the Roma are well-recognized among other ethnic groups which reside in Europe with their peculiar culture and traditions, lifestyle, appearance, skin colour, and norms of social behaviour – relatively similar views, generalisations and stereotypes about these peo-

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